Abstract. In this paper we introduce a distributed object-based document architecture called DODA in order to illustrate a novel strategy for achieving both high availability and high integrity in the context of open processing distributed between mutually suspicious domains without a common management hierarchy. Our approach to availability is to structure documents into small components called folios in such a way as to allow the maximum opportunity for concurrent processing, and to allow these components to be freely replicated and distributed. Integrity conflicts are resolved using an optimistic form of control called optimistic integrity control (OIC) applied to recoverable work units. Our approach to security is to shrinkwrap the document components using cryptographic checksums, and to provide a set of building block components called functionaries which a group of users can combine in such a way as to provide each user with a means of ensuring that an agreed notion of integrity is enforced while relying upon a minimum of non-local trust. In particular, we do not rely upon a trusted computing base or a shared system infrastructure. The local availability of document versions and of the resources to process them are completely under local user control. The lack of availability of the functionaries does not have severe consequences, and the presence of mutual suspicion makes it easier to ensure that users can trust the functionaries to provide the intended service. A major benefit of using OIC is that it allows the integration of untrusted components such as filestores and directory servers into the system. In particular, an untrusted soft locking service can be used in order to reduce the number of concurrency conflicts, and untrusted security components can be used to screen out attempted access control violations.
Introduction
The Scylla and Charybdis of open distributed computing are lack of availability and loss of security. Availability, in the sense of transparent access being provided to data and services from anywhere in the open system and at any time, and security, in the (wide) sense of the integrity of data and services being protected from the effects of malicious or inept behaviour on the part of users or other system components, are apparently paradoxical requirements. Attempts to increase availability, for example by replicating resources such as files, tend to increase the opportunities for destroying system integrity, for example by someone updating the wrong version of a file. Conversely, conventional attempts to make a distributed system more secure are usually perceived by users as an attempt to make its resources and services less available.
Most attempts to resolve this paradox in the area of what has come to be called computer supported cooperative working (CSCW) either do not explicitly address the issue of trust, or assume global trust on the part of the participants of a large part of the computer based environment itself, including infrastructure (such as hardware, operating systems, networks) and remote services (such as file stores and name servers).
The cooperative sharing of resources (including software artifacts and data) is fundamental to the motivation for building distributed systems. But in any truly open system, autonomous management domains will never unconditionally relinquish control over their resources, since there is no "lowest common boss" in a shared organizational lattice by whom disputes over such resources could subsequently be resolved. Domain administrators will always retain a last-ditch means of reclaiming control over "their" resources.
Consequently, where computer supported cooperative working crosses organizational boundaries, it is frequently inappropriate to assume global trust on the part of participants. In practice, different members of the consortium will have different views about which other parts of the system they trust, and for what purposes. Users may entertain doubts about the honesty or competence of other consortium participants or their agents, or may be unwilling to rely upon trust to ensure the correct action of remote parts of the system belonging to other domains over which they ultimately have no administrative or management control.
On the other hand, and for the same reasons, it is usually reasonable in a genuinely open system to insist that participants should trust the infrastructure and services which they themselves choose to use and which are local to their own domain 1 . This principle of local trust is the exact reverse of that obtaining in the case of a strictly hierarchical (closed) distributed system.
Because of this locality of trust, it is unsafe to rely upon a global trusted computing base to enforce a common security policy in an open distributed system, since this would require users to trust infrastructure or services in every remote participating domain. Divergence of security domains and resource management
